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INTRODUCTION 
On November 17, 2008, Somali pirates captured the Sirius Star, a 
Saudi Arabia-owned oil tanker carrying more than $100 million of 
crude oil, off the coast of Kenya.1 Long considered a historical relic, 
 
 1. See Robert F. Worth, Pirates Seize Saudi Tanker Off Kenya, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2008, at A6 available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/11/18/world/africa/18pirates.html?scp=3&sq=piratesandsaudioiltanker&st=c
se (stressing that the Sirius Star is the largest ship pirates have seized to date); see 
also Saudi tanker ‘freed off Somalia’, BBC NEWS, Jan. 9, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7820311.stm (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) 
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pirates regained the world’s interest with an increasing number of 
brazen attacks in the latter half of 2008.2 Most notably, the 
International Maritime Bureau (“IMB”) reports an alarming increase 
in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.3 
Not remotely related to the stereotypical images of eye patches, 
parrots, and swords, modern-day pirates have evolved into highly 
organized groups of individuals capable of quickly seizing some of 
the largest ships available.4 Ransom money is the primary motivation 
for the hijackings, and the pirates claim to have no desire to harm the 
ship or crew members.5 
International law, however, has not adapted to address modern-day 
piracy.6 This inadequacy led at least one country to set captured 
 
(reporting that the Sirius Star was released in exchange for a $3 million ransom). 
 2. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia Pirates Capture Tanks and Unwanted 
Global Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/world/africa/27pirates.html?scp=1&sq=soma
liapiratescapturetanksandglobalnotice&st=cse (highlighting that in September 
2008 major countries reacted when pirates captured a Ukrainian ship carrying $30 
million in weapons). This ship’s capture prompted the United States and Russia to 
send their Navies in pursuit of the hijacked ship. Id. 
 3. See ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST 
SHIPS, REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY – 30 SEPTEMBER 2008, at 32 (2008) 
[hereinafter IMB REPORT]  (establishing the International Maritime Bureau 
(“IMB”) as a division of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) and a 
non-profit organization designed to be the central point for combating all maritime 
crime). 
 4. See Roger Middleton, Briefing Paper, Piracy in Somalia: Threatening 
global trade, feeding local wars, Chatham House Africa Programme Paper 08/02, 
2008, at 4-6 (2008) available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12203 
_1008piracysomalia.pdf (describing how pirates use GPS systems, satellite phones, 
and “mother ships” to be more effective and expand the range in which they can 
operate, and how a ship can be captured in only fifteen minutes); see also 
Gettleman, supra note 2 (explaining how Somali pirates have evolved into an 
organized crime ring, with over one thousand gunmen at their disposal, capable of 
“grabbing everything from sailing yachts to oil tankers”). 
 5.  See generally Robyn Hunter, How do you pay a pirate’s ransom?, BBC 
NEWS, Dec. 3, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 7752813.stm (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2009) (estimating that the total amount of ransoms paid in 2008 was 
around $150 million); Saudi tanker ‘freed off Somalia’, supra note 1 (quoting a 
pirate named Daybad that the pirates did not intend to hurt the crew aboard the 
Sirius Star). 
 6. See discussion infra Part II.A-B (arguing that current international 
conventions are ineffective for defining and prosecuting pirates). 
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pirates free.7 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”) provides the universally-accepted definition of piracy 
under international law.8 This definition was drafted for the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas, incorporated into the UNCLOS in 
1982, and has remained largely unchanged.9 Piratical acts also fall 
under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA Convention”), even 
though the Convention’s main purpose is combating terrorism.10  
The international community has reacted in numerous ways to the 
increase in piracy.11 However, many of the current actions are not 
legal solutions to piracy, but rather measures to provide more 
security to the high-risk areas.12 In response to the perceived need for 
increased security, American private security companies have 
expressed a strong desire to provide a range of security services to 
the shipping industry.13 Controversy surrounds the use of these 
companies  providing  armed guards aboard vessels because the legal 
 
 
 7. See Marcus Hand, Danish Navy Releases 10 Somali Pirates, LLOYD'S LIST, 
Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.lloydslist.com/ 
ll/news/danish-navy-releases-10-somali-pirates/20017574257.htm (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2009) (reporting that the Danish navy freed ten suspected Somali pirates 
because the captured pirates could not be tried in Denmark). Danish authorities 
were unwilling to turn them over to the transitional government in Somalia. Id. 
 8. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (listing acts that count as piracy 
under international law); see also S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 
2008) (reaffirming that the UNCLOS is the appropriate legal framework for 
piracy). 
 9. See BARRY HART DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY 4 
(1980) (arguing that the law of the sea is “not a static subject” and questioning the 
legal view that the piracy articles do not need revision). 
 10. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter SUA 
Convention] (expressing deep concern over the increasing instances of terrorist 
attacks on the high seas and outlining a number of terrorist actions punishable 
under the Convention). 
 11. See discussion infra Part I.A (assessing the collaborative efforts of 
numerous countries). 
 12. See id. (describing actions taken by various organizations like the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and the U.N. Security Council). 
 13. See discussion infra Part I.D (discussing two American private security 
companies’ interest in protecting vessels from pirates). 
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implications are unclear if a private armed guard shoots and kills 
another person.14 
Part I of this Comment reviews recent actions taken by different 
countries and international organizations to combat the increase in 
piracy, explores the legal history of piracy, and provides different 
international piracy definitions.15 In addition, Part I examines the 
increased interest of American private security companies in 
protecting the shipping industry and the legal implications of their 
involvement.16 Part II argues that the UNCLOS and the SUA 
Convention do not effectively define piracy and are insufficient to 
prosecute the Somali pirates.17 Part II also argues that American 
private security companies can legally provide armed guards aboard 
ships.18 Part III proposes methods to ensure that there is an effective 
international legal regime that properly defines and prosecutes 
pirates.19 Finally, Part III recommends that, though legal for 
American companies, the international community should not allow 
private security companies to provide armed guards aboard vessels.20  
I. BACKGROUND 
According to the IMB, the significant increase in reported pirate 
attacks is directly related to the increased attacks by Somali pirates 
off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.21 Some shipping 
 
 14. See id. (contrasting the International Maritime Organization’s (“IMO”) 
view of armed guards with those of different private security companies). 
 15. See discussion infra Part I.A–C (explaining how countries have increased 
security to the area, how pirates have always been considered “enemies of all 
mankind,” and laying out the international legal framework for piracy). 
 16. See discussion infra Part I.D (evaluating proposals by American private 
security companies). 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.A-B (analyzing the problems with the current 
international legal definitions and jurisdiction restrictions of piracy). 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.C (noting that, although their services are 
lawful, these companies expose themselves to many different jurisdictions when 
navigating the world’s waters). 
 19. See discussion infra Part III.A-B (embracing a broader definition of piracy 
and a new international court with specific jurisdiction over suspected pirates). 
 20. See discussion infra Part III.C (suggesting that private security companies 
not be allowed to provide armed guards on vessels). 
 21. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 25 (observing the increase to eighty-
three overall pirate attacks in the third quarter of 2008 from fifty-three in the first 
quarter and sixty-three in the second quarter). Of the numerous attacks during 
FIRST AUTHOR CHECK (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  2:13 PM 
288 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:283 
companies have decided to stop using the Gulf of Aden altogether 
and instead take a considerably longer route around the African 
continent.22 Though some Somali pirates attain local hero status in 
their communities,23 piracy is still a crime and the international 
community must address it effectively.24 Both the UNCLOS and the 
SUA Convention contain articles that cover piratical acts.25 In 
addition, American private security companies have responded by 
offering security services to the shipping industry.26  
A. COMMON ELEMENTS OF RECENT PIRATE ATTACKS AND 
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 
The recent pirate attacks occur either within Somalia’s territorial 
seas or when the pirates capture a ship on the high seas and then 
retreat into Somalia’s territorial sea.27 Somalia is a prime location for 
 
2008, sixty-three took place off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Id. 
These Somali pirates managed to hijack twenty-six vessels, hold 537 crew 
members hostage, and fire upon an additional twenty-one vessels in the first nine 
months of 2008. Id. 
 22. See Michael Buchanan, Pirates Threaten Christmas Shopping, BBC NEWS, 
Oct. 23, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7686466.s tm (last visited Nov. 14, 
2009) (indicating that sailing around the Cape of Good Hope can add up to three 
weeks to a ship’s route). According to insurance companies, if ships choose to 
continue to sail through the waters off the coast of Somalia, then insurance 
premiums are likely to rise and this cost will likely be passed on to the consumer. 
Id. See also John W. Miller, Piracy Spurs Threats to Shipping Costs, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 19, 2008, at A12, available at http://online.wsj.com/articl e/SB12270186474 
3437147.html (reporting that companies whose ships opt for the longer but safer 
route, which costs far more in fuel to complete, are trying to pressure governments 
along the Gulf of Aden to crack down on piracy or face lost revenues from ships 
that pass through the area). 
 23. See Pirates are Not Swashbucklers: They’re Thieves, NAT’L NEWSPAPER, 
Nov. 19, 2008, available at http://www.thenational.ae/article/20081119/OPINIO 
N/113627547/1119 (quoting a wedding guest at a pirate’s wedding as saying that 
“[m]arrying a pirate is every Somali girl’s dream . . . [because] [h]e has power, 
money, immunity and the weapons to defend the tribe.”). 
 24. See George D. Gabel, Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as 
an International Solution to Modern-Day Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1433, 1434 
(2007) (opining that the romanticization of piracy detracts from the fact that it “has 
become a real problem”). 
 25. See discussion infra Part I.C.1-2 (introducing the relevant articles under the 
UNCLOS and the SUA Convention). 
 26. See discussion infra Part I.D (detailing recent proposals by American 
private security companies). 
 27. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 27-30 (summarizing numerous attacks 
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piracy because it has no functioning government,28 no effective 
coastal security, and a high poverty rate.29 The lack of coastal 
security is even more exasperated by the length of the coastline, 
which is 3025 kilometers.30 Most ship owners succumb to the 
pirates’ demands and pay the ransoms of hijacked ships.31 Ship 
owners believe it is better to pay the ransom than to risk losing crew 
members and equipment.32 
The international community has made a concerted effort to 
respond to the pirate attacks.33 The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (“NATO”) launched Operation Allied Provider in order 
to provide more security to the area.34 The U.N. Security Council 
passed numerous temporary resolutions.35 The most current 
 
where the pirates sailed the stolen ship back to Somalia’s coastal seas, anchored it, 
and then demanded a ransom to release the ship and its crew members). 
 28. See Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and 
Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 
18 (2007) (noting that Somalia has not had a “functioning government, no real 
laws, and no enforcement power” since 1991). 
 29. See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 8 (recognizing that the Transitional Federal 
Government (“TFG”) of Somalia does not have the ability to capture pirates or 
secure its territorial seas); see also Ethan C. Stiles, Note, Reforming Current 
International Law to Combat Modern Sea Piracy, 27 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 299, 301 (2004) (asserting that pirates frequently target locations with 
ineffective water patrols, prevalent crime, and poor economic conditions). These 
“hotspots” include the archipelagic states of Southeast Asia and South Africa. Id. 
    30. See CIA World Factbook, Africa: Somalia, available at  https://www.cia. 
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html (last visited Jan. 22, 
2010).  
 31. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 6 (hypothesizing that paying ransoms 
makes the situation worse but noting the lack of alternatives companies face when 
outside help is unavailable). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008) (welcoming 
initiatives by numerous countries, including the United States, Russia, India, and 
the United Kingdom, and praising NATO and the European Union for providing 
naval operations). 
 34. See News Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Naval Task 
Group En Route to Escort Duties off Somali Coast (Oct. 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/allied_provider/news_release/NR_0
1_08.html (explaining that Operation Allied Provider was primarily created to 
escort World Food Programme ships taking aid to Somalia but will also be used to 
create a deterrent presence in the area). 
 35. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008) 
(condemning all acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia); S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008) (grappling with maritime security concerns and 
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resolution extends the authority of cooperating states to enter and 
capture pirates in areas normally considered Somalia’s sovereign 
territory.36  
In addition, the United States has agreed to turn captured pirates 
over to Kenya for detention and prosecution.37 These types of 
agreements are currently necessary “because no country, including 
the U.S., has been willing to hold the [captured] pirates.”38 Similar 
agreements exist between other countries; however, there is no 
uniformity among the various agreements due to different political 
climates and practical issues.39 Another international collaboration 
that coordinates anti-piracy actions is the Contact Group on Piracy 
off the Coast of Somalia.40 The Contact Group’s main goal is to 
“examine practical options for strengthening the ability of countries 
willing to detain and prosecute suspected pirates.”41 
 
providing suggestions to the international community about how to address piracy 
off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden). 
 36. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, ¶ 10 (authorizing the states to treat 
Somalia’s territorial seas as high seas for the purpose of combating piracy). This 
resolution expired on December 2, 2009. Id. 
 37. See Richard Meade, U.S. to Sign Kenya Deal to Prosecute Somali Pirates, 
LLOYD’S LIST, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.lloydslist.com/ 
ll/news/viewArticle.htm?articleId=20017609027 (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) 
(observing that the use of bilateral agreements is becoming increasingly more 
common between countries that have committed ships to combat piracy in the Gulf 
of Aden and countries that are willing to accept captured pirates); see also, David 
Morgan, U.S. Delivers Seven Somali Pirate Suspects to Kenya, REUTERS, Mar. 5, 
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52480N20090305. 
 38. Morgan, supra note 37. But see U.S. Navy Arrests Pirate Suspects in Gulf 
of Aden, CNN.COM, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/02/ 
11/piracy.arrests/ 
index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) (detailing the first pirate arrests made by 
the U.S.). The pirates will be prosecuted in Kenya. Id. 
 39. See Meade, supra note 36 (reporting that pirates caught by the United 
Kingdom were being prosecuted through the Kenyan legal system and it is 
understood that pirates caught by Indian forces were handed over to Yemen 
officials). See also UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105 (specifying that the courts of 
the state that seizes pirates outside the jurisdiction of another state may decide 
what to do with the captured pirates). 
 40. See David Osler, Piracy Contact Group Launched, LLOYD’S LIST, Jan. 15, 
2009, http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm ?articleId=20017608173 
&src=rss (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) (stating that this group consists of twenty-
four countries, including the United States, and five international organizations). 
 41. See id. (reporting that the Contact Group’s first meeting on January 14, 
2009, also created separate teams focused on providing support to anti-piracy 
HARRELSON_TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  2:13 PM 
2010] PIRACY AND THE USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES 291 
B. HISTORY OF THE LAW OF PIRACY 
Piracy has existed since antiquity.42 Unlike most crimes, piracy 
conjures up wild fantasies and adventures in the minds of many 
people, especially those who grew up in Western culture.43 The 
historically accepted theory in Europe is that pirates are hostis 
humani generis, meaning “enemies of all mankind.”44 The U.S. 
Supreme Court accepted this theory and in 1820 opined that because 
pirates were hostis humani generis they were subject to prosecution 
by all nations.45 A necessary implication of designating pirates as 
hostis humani generis is that they are subject to universal 
jurisdiction.46 Universal jurisdiction means that any state can assert 
jurisdiction over the defendant even though the act did not occur in 
that state’s territorial jurisdiction.47  
C. INTERNATIONAL PIRACY DEFINITIONS 
Article 101 of the UNCLOS is the generally-accepted international 
legal definition of piracy.48 However, other conventions and 
 
operations and tracking pirates’ financial resources). 
 42. See Jason Power, Comment, Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for 
National and International Security, 10 BARRY L. REV. 111, 112 (2008) (tracing 
the act of piracy to 1190 B.C.). 
 43. See STEFAN EKLÖF, PIRATES IN PARADISE: A MODERN HISTORY OF 
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S MARITIME MARAUDERS 1 (2006) (referring to many books and 
movies that depict real and fictional pirates as “brave, adventurous, cruel, 
bloodthirsty and hungry for gold and treasures”). 
 44. See id. at 7-8 (clarifying that while this theory was generally accepted, 
many European countries used state sanctioned piracy as a war tactic that 
continued in times of peace). 
 45. See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. 144, 152 (1820) (“[Piracy] is 
punishable in the Courts of the United States . . . [and pirates] are proper objects 
for the penal code of all nations.”); see also United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 
43 U.S. 210, 232 (1844) (A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani 
generis). 
 46. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 11 (observing that piracy is the oldest offense 
that falls under universal jurisdiction). 
 47. See Power, supra note 42, at 125–26 (elaborating that once a state exercises 
universal jurisdiction over a pirate it then uses its own national laws to prosecute 
the pirate). 
 48. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33 (reaffirming that the UNCLOS is the 
appropriate legal framework for piracy). See generally DUBNER, supra note 9 
(providing an overview of the international law applicable to international piracy 
and proposing some suggestions for combating piracy in the 21st century). 
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organizations have also attempted to expand the definition of piracy 
by creating their own definitions.49 The SUA Convention does not 
specifically denominate any offenses as piracy, but it covers piratical 
acts under a broader class of illegal offenses against ships.50 
Furthermore, the IMB has created its own definition in order to 
accurately track the number of pirate attacks that occur each year.51 
1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Article 101 states that piracy is an “illegal act of violence or 
detention” that is “committed for private ends” and is directed 
against another ship on the “high seas.”52 Even though not all 
countries have ratified the UNCLOS, notably the United States,53 the 
Article 101 piracy definition is generally accepted as binding 
customary international law on all nations.54 A major component of 
the UNCLOS definition of piracy is that the act must take place on 
the high seas.55  No state has sovereignty over any part of the high 
seas, however universal jurisdiction is implicit in the UNCLOS 
under Article 105.56 Thus states will have jurisdiction over pirates if 
they are captured on the high seas. In contrast, territorial seas are 
 
 49. See discussion infra Part I.C.2-3 (distinguishing other definitions of piracy 
from the UNCLOS definition). 
 50. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (making it illegal to take over 
control of another ship by force, threat, or any form of intimidation). 
 51. IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 4. 
 52. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101. 
 53. See MARJORIE ANN BROWNE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE U.N. LAW 
OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND THE UNITED STATES: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 
OCTOBER 2003 2 (Oct. 31, 2007) (explaining that when the UNCLOS was first 
opened for signature the United States did not agree with the deep seabed 
provisions concerning “resources beyond national jurisdiction”). Acceptable 
changes were made, and in October 2007 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
voted to recommend that the Senate ratify the Convention. Id. at 1. However, the 
treaty never came before the full Senate for a vote that session. Id. at 2. 
 54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102 (1987) (stating that customary international law results when states 
act out of a sense of legal obligation to consistently follow a certain practice). 
 55. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 86 (excluding from the definition of piracy 
acts that take place in the exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), the territorial seas, a 
state’s internal waters, or archipelagic waters). 
 56. See id. art. 105 (permitting all states to seize pirates’ ships and arrest the 
people on board if the ship is in “the high seas” or “outside the jurisdiction of any 
State”). Article 105 also explicitly states that the state may determine the penalties 
to be imposed. Id. 
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waters up to twelve nautical miles off the coastal State, and a state 
has complete sovereignty over its territorial seas.57 Ships are subject 
to the laws of every state through whose territorial seas they travel 
and to the law of the state whose flag they are flying.58 
2. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation 
The SUA Convention also covers piratical acts.59 The United 
States ratified this treaty in 1995, but Somalia is not a party to the 
SUA Convention.60 The SUA Convention was proposed as a result of 
the politically-motivated hijacking of the Achille Lauro, an Italian 
cruise ship.61 Article 3 of the SUA Convention prohibits a person 
from taking a ship by force, harming a person on board a ship, and 
destroying or damaging ships.62  
Unlike the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention does not have a high 
seas requirement.63 In addition, the SUA Convention does not apply 
to ships that operate solely in the territorial seas of a coastal state.64 
The SUA Convention is also distinct from the UNCLOS because it 
 
 57. See id. art. 2-5 (detailing that the baseline for measuring territorial seas is 
the “low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts”). 
 58. See id. art. 3 (establishing the coastal state’s jurisdiction over its territorial 
sea); see also id. art. 92 (explaining that ships can only sail under one flag and are 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that flag state while on the high seas). A 
ship may not change its flag during a trip, and there are consequences for ships that 
sail under two or more flags of different states. Id. 
 59. SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3. 
 60. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN FORCE FOR 
THE UNITED STATES AS OF JANUARY 1, 2007: MARITIME MATTERS 119-20 (2007), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organ ization/89668.pdf (listing the 
137 countries that are parties to the SUA Convention). 
 61. See Power, supra note 42, at 124 (describing the hijacking in which 
terrorists demanded that Palestinians held in Israel be released or else they would 
kill passengers). The terrorists killed one American. Id. 
 62. SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3. 
 63. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 86 (applying the piracy articles only 
to the high seas), with SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 4 (applying the SUA 
Convention to all ships that travel “through or from waters beyond the outer limit 
of the territorial sea”). 
 64. See Helmut Tuerk, Combating Terrorism at Sea – The Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 15 U. MIAMI INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 337, 348 (2008) (reasoning that the SUA Convention only applies 
to ships that leave territorial seas with international travel routes). 
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focuses on punishing offenders.65 Therefore, a significant aspect of 
the SUA Convention is that it requires a state party to either 
prosecute or extradite an offender.66 
Unlike the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention does not embrace the 
notion of universal jurisdiction. Rather, under the SUA Convention 
there are three distinct ways a state party can establish jurisdiction 
over an offender in order to prosecute him or her.67 First, a state party 
can establish jurisdiction if the illegal act takes place in the state 
party’s own territorial seas.68 Second, a state party can establish 
jurisdiction if the attack was against or on board a ship flying the flag 
of a state party.69 Third, a state party can establish jurisdiction if the 
attack is perpetuated by one of its own nationals.70 Similar to the 
UNCLOS, a party to the SUA Convention does not have jurisdiction 
to venture into the territorial seas of another nation to capture 
offenders.71  
 3. International Maritime Bureau 
The IMB uses an alternate definition of piracy.72 Essentially, it 
covers all attempts to take a ship regardless of the location.73 The 
 
 65. See Carlo Tiribelli, Time to Update the 1988 Rome Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 8 OR. 
REV. INT’L. L. 133, 135 (2006) (concluding that the SUA Convention aimed to 
provide effective judicial remedies against offenders committing illegal acts 
against ships); see also Tuerk, supra note 64, at 348-49 (pointing out that even 
though the word “suppression” is in the title of the SUA Convention, there is only 
one article in the convention that actually addresses the suppression of criminal 
acts). 
 66. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 10 (requiring a state that captures 
offenders to “extradite [them]” or send the case “to its competent authorities for 
the purpose of prosecution”). 
 67. See id. art. 6 (limiting the ways a state party can establish jurisdiction over 
an offense). 
 68. Id. art. 6(1)(b). 
 69. Id. art. 6(1)(a). 
 70. Id. art. 6(1)(c). 
 71. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 25 (“[T]here is no right-of-entry into territorial 
waters for nations capable of actual suppression.”). 
 72. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (defining piracy as “[a]n act of 
boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft 
or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the 
furtherance of that act”). 
 73. See id. (clarifying that the IMB definition applies to ships that are at sea, 
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IMB uses a broader definition than the UNCLOS because the 
UNCLOS does not include acts of piracy that take place in a state’s 
territorial seas.74 The IMB definition also does not make a distinction 
between a crime committed for private ends and a crime committed 
for public ends.75 The IMB definition has no legal consequences, but 
rather deviates from the UNCLOS definition solely “[f]or statistical 
purposes”.76 
D. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES AND ARMED GUARDS 
On October 16, 2008, Blackwater Worldwide77 announced its 
interest in providing security assistance to the shipping industry to 
help combat piracy.78 Blackwater proposed to provide an escort ship 
to accompany vessels on their routes, rather than having armed 
guards on the client’s ship itself.79 Blackwater is no stranger to 
controversy and has been criticized for some of its questionable 
 
berthed or anchored). 
 74. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a)(i) (limiting the piracy definition to 
the high seas). 
 75. Compare id. art. 101(a) (narrowing the definition to crimes committed for 
“private ends”), with IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (referring to acts of piracy 
without any reference to subjective intent). 
 76. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that to get accurate 
statistics the IMB uses an alternative definition because many attacks take place 
within states’ jurisdictions and the UNCLOS definition does not encompass these 
attacks). 
 77. See Dana Hedgpeth, Blackwater Sheds Name, Shifts Focus, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 14, 2009, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conten 
t/article/2009/02/13/AR2009021303149.html (indicating that Blackwater is 
changing its name to “Xe” (pronounced “zee”) because “the idea is to define the 
company as what it is today and not what it used to be”). 
 78. See Press Release, Blackwater Worldwide, Blackwater Worldwide’s 
Maritime Operations Ready to Assist Shipping Industry (Oct. 16, 2008), available 
at http://blackwatermediacenter.com/images/pdf/10-16-08%20Maritime-Release 
.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (citing costs of piracy to the shipping industry as 
reasons for additional security). These costs include higher insurance payments, 
higher crew pay, and higher ransoms. Id. 
 79. See id. (describing the 183-foot McArthur ship as a “multi-purpose 
maritime vessel designed to support military and law enforcement training, 
peacekeeping, and stability operations worldwide.”). But see Sanhita SinhaRoy, 
Blackwater to Battle Pirates: The Private Security Firm Eyes a New Market: The 
High Seas, IN THESE TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, available at http://www.int 
hesetimes.com/article/4173/blackwater_to_battle_pirates/ (reporting that as of 
January 2009 Blackwater does not have any contracts with the shipping industry 
and that the McArthur ship is still in the United States). 
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actions in Iraq.80 However, providing support for the shipping 
industry is inherently different from providing services in Iraq 
because Blackwater would not be under contract with the U.S. State 
Department.81 HollowPoint Protective Services, another American 
private security company interested in providing security services in 
the Gulf of Aden, has clearly stated its view that armed guards are 
the answer.82 To bypass the current criticism over the use of private 
security companies in Iraq, the CEO of HollowPoint distinguished 
protection of the shipping industry from those services provided by 
Blackwater in Iraq.83  
Private security companies providing services to the shipping 
industry are not a new phenomenon.84 For years, private security 
 
 80. See, e.g., Del Quentin Wilber, Contractors Charged in ’07 Iraq Deaths, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2008, at A2, available at http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2008/12/08/AR2008120 
800486_pf.html (indicating that Blackwater Worldwide is a North Carolina-based 
security firm that has contracts to operate in Iraq, and detailing the indictment of 
six Blackwater security guards who were charged in December 2008 with 
voluntary manslaughter, attempted manslaughter, and firearm violations in the 
shooting deaths of at least fourteen Iraqi civilians).  But see, Charlie Savage, Judge 
Drops Charges From Blackwater Deaths in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec. 31, 2009, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01blackwater.html (quoting a 
federal judge’s opinion that the “mishandling of the case requires dismissal of the 
indictment against all the defendants”). 
 81. See Elise Labott, Official: U.S. Will Not Renew Iraq Contract with 
Blackwater, CNN.COM, Jan. 30, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast 
/01/30/us.blackwater.contract/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (reporting that 
Blackwater is losing its contract with the State Department because the Iraqi 
government refused to renew the company’s license). Blackwater will continue to 
have contracts with the State Department for overseas protection of diplomats. Id. 
 82. See Press Release, HollowPoint Protective Services, “Ships Need Armed 
Guards,” Says Security Firm Chief (Oct. 20, 2008) available at 
http://hollowpointprotection.com/media/HPPSPiracyPressRelease.pdf (challenging 
the “widespread opposition to the practice” and claiming that HollowPoint is 
currently in negotiations to provide armed protection to shipping companies). 
 83. See id. (“Our purpose is singular in nature. We provide protection for 
vessels, their crews and cargo. Unlike the situation in Iraq where Blackwater is 
involved in both peacekeeping and protection activities, we only respond to attacks 
on the vessels we protect.”). 
 84. See Katharine Houreld, After Iraq, Security Firms Join Somalia Piracy 
Fight, ABC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Internationa 
l/wireStory?id=6114582 (asserting that British security companies already have a 
majority of the market in the Gulf of Aden but that American companies are 
increasingly interested in providing their own services). 
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companies have provided services ranging from consulting on 
preventative measures to post-attack services.85 In addition, insurance 
companies are now providing discounted rates to ships that hire their 
own security.86 However, the use of armed guards varies from 
company to company.87  
The International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) strongly 
discourages the use of firearms to protect vessels and crews.88 The 
IMO believes that pirates may be more tempted to carry weapons if 
they believe that ships are armed, thus “escalating an already 
dangerous situation.”89 With or without firearms, private security 
companies wishing to provide security to the shipping industry are 
subject to every jurisdiction through which they sail, and the state 
whose flag they sail under.90  
 
 
 
 85. See Carolin Liss, Private Security Companies in the Fight Against Piracy 
in Asia 3 (Asia Research Centre, Working Paper No. 120, 2005) (discussing a 
range of private security services that include risk assessment, crew training, and 
recovery of hijacked vessels and crew rescue). 
 86. See Houreld, supra note 84 (announcing that Hart, a British security firm, 
has entered into an agreement with an insurance company where the insurance 
company offers discounted rates for ships that use Hart guards). There is no 
mention of whether these guards will be armed. Id. 
 87. See id. (declaring that the British security firm Eos does not arm its 
employees and that its director believes this restriction attracts customers to the 
firm). 
 88. See Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: 
Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on 
Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, ¶¶ 
60-61, MSC.1/Circ.1334 (June 23, 2009) [hereinafter IMO Guidelines] (reasoning 
that weapons use requires special training and that accidental killings can 
potentially have unforeseen consequences, legal and otherwise, even if the person 
believes it was self-defense); see also EKLÖF, supra note 43, at 128 (emphasizing 
that there are numerous other ways to fight off pirates such as using fire hoses and 
barbed wire). 
 89. IMO Guidelines¸ supra note 88, at ¶ 60. But see Press Release, 
HollowPoint Protective Services, supra note 82 (alleging that pirates know which 
ships are likely to have armed guards and they take this into account when 
targeting ships). 
 90. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing state laws ships are 
subject to under the UNCLOS); see also Liss, supra note 85, at 6 (recognizing that 
abiding by the laws of multiple jurisdictions can be a “difficult and complex task”). 
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II. ANALYSIS 
Under the UNCLOS, some of the Somali pirate attacks are not 
piracy because they do not occur on the high seas.91 States can  
exercise universal jurisdiction over pirates for acts that occur on the 
high seas only if the pirates are captured on the high seas.92 Under 
the SUA Convention, piracy is illegal, but jurisdiction restrictions 
make prosecution unlikely.93  
A. SOME SOMALI PIRATES FAIL TO MEET ALL THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE UNCLOS PIRACY DEFINITION 
An offense is piracy under the UNCLOS if it is committed for 
private ends, it occurs between two separate ships, and it takes place 
on the high seas.94 Some Somali pirate attacks meet the first two 
requirements but fail to meet the high seas requirement.95 Failure to 
meet the high seas requirement means the acts are not piracy under 
international law. Some Somali pirate attacks meet all three 
requirements, but states cannot exercise universal jurisdiction to 
prosecute the pirates unless  the pirates are seized on the high seas.96 
Typically, however, the Somali pirates evade capture on high seas by 
retreating to Somalia’s territorial seas. 
1. Somali Pirates Meet the “Private Ends” Requirement and the 
“Two-Ship” Requirement 
Article 101(a) states that “private ends” must motivate the illegal 
act and a person on a private ship must commit the act.97 A major 
 
 91. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101 (limiting the definition of piracy to the 
high seas); see also Bahar, supra note 28, at 17 (concluding that harmed states 
must utilize other mechanisms if the act takes place in territorial seas). 
 92. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 93. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 10 (dictating what a signatory 
state should do if it apprehends an offender); see also Tiribelli, supra note 65, at 
149 (arguing that a “fundamental defect” of the SUA Convention is that it does not 
actually have a “strict obligation to extradite”). 
 94. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a). 
 95. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 25 (reporting twelve attacks in Somalia’s 
territorial seas). 
 96. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105 (limiting the seizure of ships to the 
high seas); see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 27-30 (observing that the 
Somali pirates are anchoring the stolen ships in Somalia’s territorial seas). 
 97. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a). 
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exception to the UNCLOS definition of piracy is that politically 
motivated acts do not meet the “private ends” requirement and are 
therefore not piracy.98 For example, the hijacking of the Achille 
Lauro was not piracy because it was politically motivated.99 In 
contrast, the Somali pirates operate for large amounts of ransom 
money and not for any political reason.100 Ransoms are paid in cash 
and the Somali pirates take this cash for their personal gain.101  
In addition to the “private ends” requirement, the act must involve 
two ships to qualify as piracy.102 Article 101 of the UNCLOS 
specifically states that the acts must be “against another ship or 
aircraft.”103 The Somali pirates meet this requirement because they 
are approaching the targeted ships in separate ships.104 The “two-
ship” requirement is always going to be met unless the Somali 
pirates start acting as stowaways or pose as crew members.105 It is 
highly unlikely that Somali pirates will change their current strategy 
because they have already created an effective system where they use 
 
 98. See JACK A. GOTTSCHALK & BRIAN P. FLANAGAN, JOLLY ROGER WITH AN 
UZI: THE RISE AND THREAT OF MODERN PIRACY 35 (2000) (concluding that the act 
does not have to be “sanctioned by a recognized government” to be considered 
political). 
 99. See id. at 36-37 (using the politically-motivated Achille Lauro incident as 
an example to illustrate the problems with defining piracy as an act of private 
motivation under the UNCLOS). Both a federal judge and the President of the 
United States cited that incident as piracy even though technically it was not 
legally correct. Id. at 37. 
 100. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 51–65 (narrating the details of each 
reported pirate attack and concluding that the trend appears to be that pirates are 
operating purely for ransom money). 
 101. See Posting of Jeffrey Gettleman to The Ledge, The New York Times 
News Blog, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/q-a-with-a-pirate-we-
just-want-the-money/?ref=africa (Sept. 30, 2008, 09:10 EST) (quoting the 
spokesperson for the Somali pirates holding a Ukrainian ship hostage at the time of 
the interview as saying the ransom money is used to “protect ourselves from 
hunger”). 
 102. See GOTTSCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 98, at 35 (describing the 
hijacking of the Santa Maria, a Portuguese cruise ship, as not piracy because no 
second vessel had been used to board the ship). 
 103. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a)(i). 
 104. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining how the Somali pirates use 
small skiffs to attack larger ships). 
 105. See Power, supra note 42, at 119 (hypothesizing that the only way to attack 
a vessel in international waters is to use another vessel). 
FIRST AUTHOR CHECK (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  2:13 PM 
300 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:283 
quicker, smaller, and easily maneuverable ships to attack.106 
Therefore, the Somali pirates fulfill the “private ends” and the “two-
ship” requirement.107  
2. When Somali Pirates Fail to Meet the High Seas Requirement the 
Acts Are not Piracy 
The final requirement under the UNCLOS for an act to qualify as 
piracy is that pirates must commit the act on the high seas or outside 
the jurisdiction of any state.108 The Somali pirates do not meet this 
requirement when the attacks occur in the territorial seas of 
Somalia.109 When attacks take place in Somalia’s territorial seas, the 
acts fail to meet the high seas requirement based purely on 
geography.110 However, when the Somali pirates attack ships in the 
Gulf of Aden farther than twelve nautical miles off the coast, the act 
is piracy under the UNCLOS.111  Thus, twelve miles is the 
determinative distance for classifying an attack as piracy. 
 3. The Inability of States to Capture Pirates on the High Seas 
Means States Cannot Exercise Universal Jurisdiction over Them 
States only have the authority to seize the pirates on the high seas.112 
When the Somali pirates retreat to Somalia’s territorial seas they are 
no longer on the high seas and only Somalia has jurisdiction over 
them.113 It is estimated that the time between sighting a pirate, and 
 
 106. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that the pirates also use 
“mother ships” to increase their range, and so many times there are at least three 
ships directly or indirectly involved in every attack). 
 107. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. art. 101; see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 25 (acknowledging 
at least twelve attacks took place off the coast of Somalia). 
 110. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 86 (affirming that territorial seas are not 
considered part of the high seas). 
 111. See id. art. 3; see also Encyclopedia Britannica, Gulf of Aden, available at 
http://www.britannica.com /EBchecked/topic/5650/Gulf-of-Aden (describing the 
total width of the Gulf of Aden as 300 miles). 
 112. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105. 
 113. See id. art. 2 (declaring that the coastal state has sovereignty over its 
territorial seas); see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 27-30 (indicating that in all 
instances where pirates hijacked a ship in the Gulf of Aden, the pirates then took 
the ship and crew and anchored off the coast of Somalia). 
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the pirate boarding a target ship is fifteen minutes.114 This short time 
span makes it extremely difficult for a state to capture pirates on the 
high seas before they retreat into Somalia’s territorial seas.115 Since a 
naval ship cannot seize the Somali pirates once they retreat into 
Somalia’s territorial seas, it is difficult for foreign states to capture 
pirates and establish jurisdiction over them.116  
One counterargument to the inability to establish jurisdiction over 
pirates is that under the UNCLOS framework countries are legally 
entitled to enter the territorial seas of Somalia because Somalia does 
not actually have any territorial seas.117 The UNCLOS is a treaty 
among states and only states can have territorial seas.118 Since 
Somalia is a failed state, it is unable to legally claim a territorial 
sea.119 Therefore, the argument goes, the waters off the coast of 
Somalia are “outside the jurisdiction of any State.”120  
 On July 24, 1989, the then-current Somalia government 
ratified the UNCLOS,121 and affirmatively claimed an extreme 
 
 114. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 4 (maintaining that the short amount of 
time it takes to seize a ship explains why waters with security patrols are still 
ineffective at deterring attacks). It is hypothesized that to actually prevent an attack 
a naval vessel would have to be incredibly close to the ship under attack and 
helicopters would have to be instantaneously ready to assist. Id. 
 115. But see id. at 4 (recognizing that a U.S. naval ship was able to prevent a 
pirate attack on August 8, 2008, but also acknowledging that the naval ship was 
only ten miles away and able to launch helicopters). 
 116. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 111(3) (prohibiting a state from letting its 
ship pursue a second ship into the second ship’s state territorial waters or another 
state’s territorial seas). 
 117. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 67 (arguing that the United States could enter 
within twelve nautical miles of Somalia’s coast without legal consequences). 
 118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §201 (1987) (“[A] state is an entity that has a defined territory and a 
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages 
in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”). 
 119. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 67 (citing reasons why Somalia is not a state, 
including that Somalia does not have a functioning government, that it has 
continuously been in a state of civil war, and that in January 2007 it declared a 
state of emergency). 
 120. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a) (limiting the area where piracy acts 
can occur). 
 121. LAW OF THE SEA, BULLETIN NO. 37, at 2 (1998) available at 
http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletinE37.pdf. 
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territorial sea of two hundred nautical miles.122  However, that legal 
entity has ceased to exist. Since 1991 none of the transitional 
governments in Somalia have formally declared a territorial sea.123 
Under the UNCLOS a state has to affirmatively declare its territorial 
sea.124  The UNCLOS does not automatically create a territorial sea 
for every coastal State, but rather only authorizes a state to legally 
claim a territorial sea up to twelve nautical miles from its coast.125 
Regardless of the fact that no Somalia transitional government has 
laid claim to a territorial sea, the world recognizes Somalia as a 
sovereign entity with jurisdiction over its territorial seas.126  
However, following the framework of UNCLOS, Somalia’s 
territorial sea is recognized as twelve nautical miles, not two 
hundred.127  Thus, for purposes of combating piracy Somalia does 
have a territorial sea and the UNCLOS does not reach the Somali 
pirates because they are either operating in, or retreating to, Somalia 
territorial seas.128 
B. SOMALI PIRATES ENGAGE IN ILLEGAL ACTS UNDER THE SUA 
CONVENTION, BUT EXTRADITION TO SOMALIA IS IMPOSSIBLE AND 
JURISDICTION RESTRICTIONS MAKE PROSECUTION UNLIKELY 
Under the SUA Convention, the first determination is whether the 
pirates’ actions are an illegal offense.129 If the actions are illegal, the 
capturing country either has to prosecute or extradite the suspected 
 
 122. Table of Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_s
ummary_of_claims.pdf. 
 123. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 68 (concluding that it is strictly a “plain 
language” argument to say that Somalia has no right to declare a territorial sea). 
 124. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 3 (affirming the right of every coastal state 
to claim a territorial sea).   
 125. Id. 
 126. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33 (“Reaffirming its respect for the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and the unity of 
Somalia.”). 
 127. See Bahar, supra note 28, at 69 (noting that Kenya rejected a motion 
arguing lack of jurisdiction based on Somalia’s claim to a two hundred mile 
territorial sea). 
 128. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 17-20 (detailing how the Somali pirates 
either operate in Somalia territorial seas or take captured ships back to them). 
 129. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (listing illegal offenses under 
the convention). 
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pirate.130 However, there is no “strict obligation to extradite” the 
offender.131 If there is no extradition agreement between the two 
countries  wishing  to  extradite  a  pirate,  then the capturing country 
“may, at its option,” use the SUA Convention as a basis for 
extradition.132  
1. Somali Pirates Engage in Illegal Acts Under the SUA Convention 
Article 3(1)(a) of the SUA Convention makes it a crime for any 
person to use force to seize or take control of a ship.133 The Somali 
pirates’ acts fit this definition because they are using force to seize 
ships.134 A pirate necessarily has to use force to seize a ship; no 
legitimate ship owner is going to willfully turn his or her ship over to 
a gang of pirates.135 Furthermore, if pirates believed that force was 
not necessary to capture ships they would not arm themselves with a 
small arsenal of weapons.136 
 
 
 130. See id. art. 10(1) (commanding the state either to initiate proceedings 
against the accused or extradite him or her to a country that will prosecute the 
unlawful offense). 
 131. See Tiribelli, supra note 65, at 149 (arguing that this is a “fundamental 
defect” with the agreement). 
 132. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 11(2) (allowing states that make 
“extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty” to use discretion in deciding 
whether to extradite under the convention); see also Power, supra note 42, at 127-
28 (raising the issue that many countries that pirates target do not have extradition 
agreements with other countries). 
 133. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (outlining other illegal offenses 
under the convention, such as destroying a ship, harming or killing a crew member, 
and endangering the safe navigation of a ship). 
 134. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 51-53 (providing detailed reports of 
pirates using force in attacks off Somalia); see also id. at 14 (recording that the 
majority of attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia involved pirates armed with 
guns). One narrative states, “[p]irates armed with guns and grenade launchers 
attacked the fishing vessel and hijacked it to an unknown location. Twenty-six 
crew members were taken hostage and a ransom demanded for their safe release. 
On 25 April 2008 the crew and vessel were released by the pirates. It appears the 
owners paid a ransom . . . .” Id. at 51-52. 
 135. See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 4, at 4 (providing an example of how one 
boat went into a high-speed spin until the attackers gave up and contending that 
captains take whatever evasive actions they can to prevent pirates from boarding 
their ships). 
 136. See id. (asserting that pirates use automatic weapons and rocket launchers 
to assault ships). 
FIRST AUTHOR CHECK (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  2:13 PM 
304 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:283 
Some Somali pirates might also commit crimes delineated under 
Article 3(1)(b) or 3(1)(c) of the SUA Convention.137 Article 3(1)(b) 
pertains to individuals who harm a person onboard a ship, and 
Article 3(1)(c) covers individuals who destroy or damage ships.138 
However, the Somali pirates’ sole motivation is ransom money and 
they rarely harm crew members or destroy or damage ships.139 Thus, 
Article (3)(1)(a) applies to all Somali pirates, and in some remote 
cases other provisions may also apply.140 
2. Extradition to Somalia is Impossible and Jurisdiction Restrictions 
Make Prosecution by a Capturing State Unlikely 
Under the SUA Convention, a capturing country must prosecute or 
extradite a person engaging in an illegal act.141 A capturing country 
cannot extradite Somali pirates to Somalia unless it has an 
extradition agreement with Somalia.142 A capturing country does not 
have the option to use the SUA Convention in lieu of an extradition 
agreement  because Somalia is not a party to the SUA Convention.143 
 
 
 137. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (delineating illegal acts of force 
often committed by pirates when seizing or attempting to seize a ship). 
 138. Id.; see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 29 (detailing how armed pirates 
fired at ships in order to hijack them). In addition, one ship Master had a heart 
attack and died onboard after pirates successfully hijacked his ship. Id. at 30. 
 139. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 6 (stating that for the most part crews are 
treated well but that there have also been reports of crews being beaten, or not 
being given adequate food and water); see also David Osler, Yardimci Mulls 
Armed Guards for Ships Transiting Gulf of Aden, LLOYD’S LIST, Jan. 13, 2009, 
http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm?articleId=20017607278 (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2009) (reporting that the crew of a hijacked ship was safe and in 
good health after being held hostage for over two months). 
 140. See SUA Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (establishing that an individual 
can be prosecuted for seizing a ship, without making injury to passengers a 
necessary element of the offense). 
 141. See id. art. 10 (providing that when a state does not extradite an alleged 
offender, it must prosecute him or her “without delay”); see also Power, supra note 
42, at 127 (asserting that if the state cannot exercise proper jurisdiction over the 
individual engaged in the illegal activity the state must then extradite the individual 
to an authority that has proper jurisdiction). 
 142. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES 
LAW AND PRACTICE 25 (Oxford University Press, 2007) (establishing that most 
states believe the duty to extradite arises from treaties or national legislation). 
 143. See Int’l. Mar. Org., http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=91 0 (follow 
“Status of Conventions by country” hyperlink)  (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). 
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Furthermore, even if extradition were possible, Somalia lacks a 
functioning government capable of prosecuting the pirates.144 
A capturing state has three options under the SUA Convention to 
establish jurisdiction over pirates.145 Still, capturing states will have 
difficultly establishing jurisdiction over the Somali pirates, thus 
making prosecution unlikely.146 The first jurisdiction option does not 
apply because the pirates are not operating in the territorial seas of 
any state party; the pirates are operating in Somalia’s territorial seas 
or the Gulf of Aden.147 Second, it is unlikely that a state party can 
establish jurisdiction over the Somali pirates because the pirates 
hijacked a ship sailing under its flag. A majority of the hijacked ships 
fly under the flags of Antigua Barbuda, Cyprus, Liberia, the Marshall 
Islands, Panama, and Singapore.148 Many of the naval ships in the 
area are from the United States, the European Union, Denmark, 
Russia, India, and Canada.149 Therefore, a U.S. ship could capture 
pirates attacking a Liberian ship, but the United States has no 
jurisdiction to prosecute them under the SUA Convention because 
the pirates did not attack a U.S. ship. Finally, the third jurisdiction 
option does not apply because the pirates are from Somalia; they are 
not nationals from any state party.150 Therefore, it is unlikely that a 
capturing state could establish jurisdiction to prosecute the pirates 
under the SUA Convention.151 
 
 144. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, at 1 (recognizing Somalia’s inability to 
effectively combat piracy). 
 145. See discussion supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the ways a nation can establish 
jurisdiction under the SUA Convention). 
 146. See SUA Convention, supra note 10,  art. 6(4) (mandating that a capturing 
country take the necessary measures to establish jurisdiction over applicable 
offenses). 
 147. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 21 (stating that there were twelve attacks 
off Somalia and fifty-one in the Gulf of Aden during the first three quarters of 
2008). 
 148. See id. at 17-18 (detailing that out of forty-three countries whose ships 
were attacked in 2008, ships flying under the flags of these six countries accounted 
for almost fifty percent of attacked ships). 
 149. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, at ¶ 6 (recognizing the efforts of these 
countries to provide security to the coast of Somalia). 
 150. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 21 (noting that Somali pirates are 
responsible for the increased attacks in the Gulf of Aden). 
 151. See discussion supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the ways a nation can establish 
jurisdiction under the SUA Convention). 
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C. AMERICAN PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES CAN LEGALLY 
PROVIDE ARMED GUARDS TO THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY 
Private security companies must abide by the laws of all territorial 
seas through which they travel.152 In addition, these companies must 
always comply with the laws of the vessel’s flag state.153 Therefore, 
even if a ship’s flag state allows for armed guards, vessels will 
encounter problems when navigating through numerous territorial 
seas.154  For example, problems will potentially arise when a ship 
travels through territorial seas that do not allow armed guards or 
which have stringent gun control laws. Ships are not capable of 
easily removing prohibited weapons when travelling by sea.  
American private security companies sailing under the American 
flag are allowed to have armed guards aboard vessels.155 In addition, 
these companies will not run into legal problems in Somalia’s 
territorial seas because there is no functioning government in 
Somalia.156 As long as the companies are in compliance with the laws 
of every other territorial sea through which they travel to reach the 
Gulf of Aden, it is legal for private security companies to provide 
armed guards.157 
 
 152. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 2 (establishing the coastal state’s 
jurisdiction over its territorial seas); see also Liss, supra note 85, at 6 (recognizing 
that “reputable” companies always have to abide by the laws of the countries they 
are operating in). 
 153. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 92 (determining that ships shall sail under 
only one state flag and that this state retains exclusive jurisdiction over the ship 
when it is on the high seas). 
 154. See Liss, supra note 85, at 7 (citing that employees of Background Asia, a 
private security company, are required to “disassemble their weapons and lock the 
ammunition magazines and firing pins in separate locations” when traveling 
through Singapore waters). The author also reports that Malaysia and Indonesia do 
not allow armed escorts, and that Malaysian authorities have warned that any 
armed escorts found in Malaysian waters would be detained, and the crew arrested. 
Id. 
 155. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (affirming an individual’s right to bear arms). 
 156. See supra note 28; see also Houreld, supra note 84, at 1 (reporting that 
Somali government officials also approve of the use of private companies). 
 157. See Press Release, HollowPoint Protection Services, supra note 82, at 1 
(quoting the CEO as saying, “[y]es, we have established which countries allow 
private armed agents on their vessels”). 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To address the surge in piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the 
Gulf of Aden, the United Nations (“U.N.”) should update the 
UNCLOS piracy definition and create a new international court with 
exclusive jurisdiction to only prosecute pirates. Somali pirates are 
rarely captured and they have no fear of prosecution.158 Current 
worldwide cooperation to provide increased security to the area is 
necessary, but the area is too large for the naval ships to prevent all 
attacks.159 Private security companies can provide a useful role in 
filling in gaps to protect ships, but the international community 
should not allow these companies to provide armed guards aboard 
vessels.160 
A. THE U.N. SHOULD REMOVE THE HIGH SEAS REQUIREMENT 
UNDER THE UNCLOS DEFINITION OF PIRACY AND REMOVE THE 
JURISDICTION RESTRICTION THAT COUNTRIES SEIZE PIRATES ON 
THE HIGH SEAS FOR FAILED  STATES 
States like Somalia, without a functioning government, can 
become breeding zones for piracy.161 Yet, international law under the 
UNCLOS does not cover the piratical acts off these coastal states 
because of the requirement that the act take place on the high seas.162 
As a solution, the U.N. should amend the UNCLOS piracy definition 
 
 158. See Katharine Houreld & Mike Corder, Few Nations Willing to Prosecute 
Pirates, DENVER POST, Apr. 18, 2009, available at http://www.denverpost.com/na 
tionworld/ci_12169011 (concluding that many pirates are set free because of the 
“many pitfalls along the path to prosecution”). But see Devlin Barrett, Source: 
Captured Somali Pirate to Face Trial in NY, BREITBART, Apr. 16, 2009, available 
at http://www/breitbart.com/article.phhp?id=D97J S0T01&show_article=1 
(reporting that a Somali pirate who held a U.S. captain hostage will be sent to New 
York for prosecution). 
 159. See Anita Powell, Ships Have Few Options Against Somali Pirates, ABC 
NEWS, Apr. 10, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go .com/International/WireStory 
?id=7304362&page=1 (recognizing that it would take sixty-one ships to control 
even a fraction of where pirates have operated). 
 160. See Liss, supra note 85, at 3 (listing services offered by security 
companies, such as risk assessment and crew member training). 
 161. See Stiles, supra note 29, at 301 (acknowledging the difficulty in 
controlling the coast of Somalia because of anarchy and corruption). 
 162. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 101(a)(i) (limiting the definition of piracy 
to acts committed on the high seas). 
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to include areas other than the high seas.163 Historically, the high seas 
were perhaps one of the riskiest places for piracy, but modern day 
pirates now operate much more often in territorial seas of non-
functioning states.164 Some Somali pirates do not fall under the 
UNCLOS because they do not operate in the high seas.165 Somalia 
has no  government capable of capturing  and prosecuting pirates 
under Somali law; therefore international law should be expanded to 
address this shortfall.166 Since the UNCLOS is generally-accepted 
customary international law, and the Somali pirates meet the other 
UNCLOS requirements, removing the high seas requirement places 
the pirates squarely within the UNCLOS and provides a modern 
piracy definition for the international community.167  
For failed states, the U.N. should also remove the requirement that 
countries seize pirates on the high seas.168 There is no official 
definition of a failed state, but most definitions include the inability 
of the government to control the territory, lack of stability for the 
citizens, no economic growth, and much violence.169 Countries 
should be able to pursue and capture pirates within these failed 
states’ territorial seas. The U.N. Security Council essentially waived 
 
 163. See discussion supra Part II.A (analyzing the drawbacks of the high seas 
restriction). 
 164. See DUBNER, supra note 9, at 160 (arguing that territorial seas are targeted 
by pirates in coastal states where the pirates know there is no adequate security or 
law enforcement); see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (adopting a different 
definition of piracy because the UNCLOS does not address pirate attacks that take 
place in states’ sovereign territories). 
 165. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (analyzing the drawbacks of the high seas 
restriction). 
 166. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, at 1 (noting Somalia’s inability to 
handle the increase in piracy). 
 167. See discussion supra Part II.A. (arguing that the high seas requirement 
forbids the Somali pirates’ attacks from being piracy under the UNCLOS). 
 168. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105 (allowing states to only capture 
pirates on the high seas, outside the territorial seas of any other state). 
 169. Rosa Ehrenrich Brooks, Failed States, or the State as Failure?, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2005); see also Foreign Policy, Failed States Index 2009 
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states 
_index_faq_methodology (listing the following factors used to determine a failed 
state: “Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, 
Uneven Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization of the State, Public 
Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External 
Intervention”). 
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the high seas jurisdiction restriction  when it passed Resolution 
1846.170 This Resolution was a good first step in recognizing how 
pirates take advantage of failed states by operating in, or retreating to 
these states’ territorial seas.171 However, the resolution was only 
temporary.172 Thus, for failed states, the U.N. should permanently 
remove from the UNCLOS the jurisdiction restriction  that countries 
capture pirates on the high seas.173 
B. THE U.N. SHOULD CREATE A NEW INTERNATIONAL COURT 
WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO ONLY PROSECUTE PIRATES 
To date, most countries have been unwilling to prosecute 
pirates.174 The use of bilateral agreements between certain countries 
will not encompass all captured pirates, only those pirates captured 
by countries who have entered into such agreements.175 Bilateral 
agreements between two countries are not an ideal way to deal with 
piracy because piracy affects the entire international community, not 
just ship owners, crew members, and governments of the ships 
attacked.176 Therefore, the U.N. should create a new international 
 
 170. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, at ¶ 10 (authorizing states to enter 
Somalia’s territorial seas and use all necessary means to repress piracy). 
 171. See IMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 27-30 (detailing how the Somali pirates 
anchor hijacked ships in Somalia’s territorial seas). 
 172. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 33, at ¶ 10 (declaring that the resolution will 
expire in December 2009). 
 173. See id. at 1 (recalling all previous U.N. Security Resolutions passed that 
relate to piracy off the coast of Somalia and noting that S.C. Res. 1846 went into 
force on the day S.C. Res. 1816 expired). Security Council Resolution 1816 was 
the precursor to Resolution 1846, declaring that states can enter Somalia’s 
territorial waters to stop piracy. See S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 
(June 2, 2008). 
 174. See Meade, supra note 37 (hypothesizing that a deal between the United 
States and Kenya is a significant move towards creating a process to prosecute 
pirates). But see Alasdair Sandford, Somali Pirates Face Prosecution in France, 
Apr. 16, 2008, BBC NEWS, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/ 
learningenglish/newsenglish/witn/2008/04/080416_somali_pirates.shtml (reporting 
that the French were going to prosecute Somali pirates who held a French yacht 
hostage “in what would be the first trial of its kind”). 
 175. See Meade, supra note 37 (outlining a proposed deal where Kenya will 
only prosecute pirates caught by the United States). 
 176. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 1 (hypothesizing that the costs of piracy 
increase the cost of manufactured goods and oil and that piracy has the potential to 
cause a major environmental disaster). 
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court  specifically designed to prosecute captured pirates.177 The 
UNCLOS defines piracy, but it relies on states and their national 
laws to actually prosecute pirates.178 A new international court with 
exclusive jurisdiction over pirates would take this pressure off 
national governments.179 
In addition, this court could evaluate issues such as whether piracy 
did occur and the appropriate penalties to be imposed.180 Once the 
UNCLOS definition of piracy is updated, the new court will then 
have a modern standard to apply to the pirates’ acts.181 Furthermore, 
this international court could also determine its own penalties for the 
punishment of pirates, thus providing one standard for the entire 
international community.182 Currently, different countries have a 
wide range of penalties for pirates, and it is inequitable for pirates to 
receive a harsher or more lenient sentence just because a certain 
country captures them.183  
Inherent in this recommendation is the idea that states will have to 
voluntarily submit to jurisdiction by another body.184 In order to get 
as many countries as possible to submit to the jurisdiction of the new 
 
 177. See Joshua Michael Goodwin, Note, Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate: 
Time for an Old Couple to Part, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 973, 1008-09 (2006) 
(insisting that the creation of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) 
demonstrates that states are willing to work together to combat international 
crime); see also DUBNER, supra note 9, at 161 (proposing asserting jurisdiction 
over pirates in a specific “dispute settlement mechanism”). 
 178. See Michael H. Passman, Protections Afforded to Captured Pirates Under 
the Law of War and International Law, 33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 10 (2008) (explaining 
that pirates are unique because they are not tried in an international court under 
international law when they are caught outside the jurisdiction of any state). 
 179. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105 (allowing for the courts of the state 
that seized the pirates to decide on the proper penalties). 
 180. See DUBNER, supra note 9, at 162 (purporting that having an international 
tribunal to specifically deal with pirates might also lead to more prosecutions 
because some states might currently be reluctant to punish pirates for fear of 
retaliation by terrorist groups). 
 181. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing for a change in the current 
definition of piracy under the UNCLOS). 
 182. See Goodwin, supra note 174, at 1008 (pointing out that because all nations 
have different laws, pirates can receive a sentence of anywhere from three years to 
life in prison depending on which country is prosecuting them). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See DUBNER, supra note 9, at 161-62 (proposing that the jurisdiction of the 
international court should include the ability to impose penalties and grant political 
asylum). 
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international court, this court should only have the power to 
prosecute crimes relating to piracy.185 It is more likely that states  
will submit to the jurisdiction of a court that deals with one 
specifically-defined crime.186  
C. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD NOT ALLOW 
PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES TO PUT ARMED GUARDS ON 
VESSELS 
Arming vessels creates a potential situation of escalated costs and 
violence.187 Innocent crew members are more likely to suffer the 
negative consequences of having armed guards on vessels. The 
pirates claim to have no desire to hurt the crew members but they do 
fire assault rifles “indiscriminately” during attacks.188 Violence could 
quickly escalate and produce deadly consequences if an armed guard 
began firing back.189 The crew members are currently safer being 
taken hostage rather than being caught in the middle of a gun 
battle.190 Some argue that the uncertainty of not knowing whether a 
vessel is armed creates a beneficial deterrent effect.191 However, 
ships can utilize plenty of other defense mechanisms to deter pirates 
that do not threaten the lives of the crew members.192  
 
 185. Cf. Goodwin, supra note 174, at 1008–09 (disagreeing with the creation of 
a new tribunal). 
 186. Cf. id. (pointing out that not all countries have submitted to jurisdiction of 
the ICC). 
 187. See EKLÖF, supra note 43, at 129 (concluding that many times the costs to 
the ship owner of hiring a private security company are high compared to the cost 
and risk of piracy); see also IMO Guidelines, supra note 88, at ¶ 60 (arguing that 
having firearms on board would just encourage pirates to carry firearms). 
 188. See Houreld, supra note 84, at 2 (explaining the manager of IMB’s 
understanding of how pirates operate). 
 189. See GOTTSCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 98, at 135 (noting the 
incremental nature of piracy-related violence). 
 190. See supra Introduction (noting that pirates are operating for ransom money 
and in general do not want to hurt the crew); see also IMB REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 27-30 (providing numerous examples of crew members being returned after a 
ransom was paid). 
 191. See GOTTSCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 98, at 135 (quoting Capt. 
Philip Cheek as saying, “suspicion alone, that a vessel is carrying among her crew, 
half a dozen trained killers would have a snowball effect”). “It would probably 
only need one surprise shoot-out, . . . killing every boarder, to send out the right 
message.” Id. 
 192. See Houreld, supra note 84, at 3 (listing a range of “[h]igh-tech but non-
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It has been suggested that the U.N. could facilitate putting 
professionally-trained armed guards aboard ships.193 Yet, it is highly 
unlikely that all countries could reach an agreement because not 
every country directly benefits from maritime commerce.194 
Ultimately, the dangers to the crew members outweigh the potential 
deterrent effect of putting armed guards on vessels and companies 
like Blackwater Worldwide and HollowPoint Services should not 
provide armed guards to the shipping industry. Furthermore, private 
security companies do nothing to help address the underlying 
problems of piracy or aid in the effective prosecution of pirates.195  
CONCLUSION 
Current international conventions do not provide a proper legal 
regime to adequately define and prosecute Somali pirates. In order to 
effectively address the increase in pirate attacks, the U.N. should 
remove the high seas requirement from the UNCLOS piracy 
definition, and the jurisdiction restrictions for failed states. In 
addition, the U.N. should create a new international court that has 
exclusive jurisdiction to only prosecute pirates. American private 
security companies can legally put armed guards aboard American 
ships, but they must abide by the laws of every territorial sea through 
which they travel. However, armed guards unnecessarily increase the 
risks to crew members and the international community should not 
allow them on vessels as a solution to the increase in piracy attacks.  
 
 
lethal weapons” including dazzle guns and microwave guns). 
 193. See GOTTSCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 98, at 137 (commending the 
idea if it could actually be accomplished). 
 194. See id. (hypothesizing that the states that do not directly benefit from 
maritime commerce would not agree to pay for or provide support for arming 
vessels). 
 195. See Liss, supra note 85, at 12 (acknowledging that private security 
companies may have some benefits to preventing individual attacks, but that they 
do nothing to “address the underlying root causes of modern day piracy itself.”). 
